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adelphi 
adelphi is a leading independent think tank and public policy consultancy on climate, 
environment and development. Our mission is to improve global governance through 
research, dialogue and consultation. We offer demand-driven, tailor-made services for 
sustainable development, helping governments, international organizations, businesses and 
nonprofits design strategies for addressing global challenges. 
Our staff of more than 200 provides high-quality interdisciplinary research, strategic policy 
analysis and advice, and corporate consulting. We facilitate policy dialogue and provide 
training for public institutions and businesses worldwide, helping to build capacity for 
transformative change. Since 2001 we have successfully completed over 800 projects 
worldwide. Our work covers the following key areas: Climate, Energy, Resources, Green 
Economy, Sustainable Business, Green Finance, Peace and Security, International 
Cooperation and Urban Transformation. 
Partnerships are key to the way we work at adelphi. By forging alliances with individuals and 
organizations, we help strengthen global governance and so promote transformative change, 
sustainable resources management and resilience. adelphi is a values-based organization 
with an informal culture based on excellence, trust and cooperation. Sustainability is the 
foundation of our internal and external conduct. Our activities are climate-neutral and we 
have a certified environmental-management system. 
 
Climate Focus 
Climate Focus is a highly specialized carbon market and climate policy consultancy 
supporting clients around the globe with innovating, designing and implementing market-
based mechanisms, climate strategies, offset projects, methodologies, and baseline studies. 
Established in 2004, we have provided independent and unbiased support to a wide range of 
clients and written numerous publications on designing emissions trading schemes and 
carbon prices. We have provided advisory services in more than 50 countries to 
governments, companies, carbon funds, international organizations and non-profit 
organizations. Our core team comprises specialists operating in the carbon market since its 
inception, who are experienced in advising on legal and technical aspects of policy-making. 
Climate Focus has been actively involved in the design, reform, and communication of 
carbon prices, having supported governments as diverse as Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Mexico, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Germany and the Netherlands in these processes. 
We have led or co-authored several of the leading publications on carbon pricing, including 
the Carbon Tax Guide: A Handbook for Policy Makers and the Guide to Communicating 
Carbon Pricing. We are also currently developing cutting-edge training materials on carbon 
prices and on communicating carbon pricing. 
Climate Focus has offices in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Berlin, Bogota, and Washington, D.C. 
Further details about Climate Focus can be found at: www.climatefocus.com 
 
Perspectives Climate Group 
Perspectives is an independent, highly specialized group of research and consulting firms, 
which have been providing the private sector, governments and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) with practical solutions for international climate policy instruments, the 
international greenhouse gas markets and international climate finance instruments. 
Perspectives aims to be an internationally leading consultancy in the climate policy and 
carbon markets – we strive for excellence by delivering high quality and customized 
solutions to our clients, whilst maintaining the highest ecological standards. Perspectives 
was founded in 2003. The company operates offices in Freiburg, Mülheim (Germany), 
Zürich/Gockhausen (Switzerland) and Alicante (Spain) and consults clients all around the 
globe in more than 60 countries. 
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Perspectives offers world leading expertise on carbon pricing, as well as innovative climate 
finance instruments for both mitigation and adaptation. The company is internationally 
recognized for its outstanding contribution to the establishment and advancement of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including the management and regulatory evolution 
of Programmes of Activities (PoAs), successful design of Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) protocols, design of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMAs), 
and pioneering new market mechanisms. Perspectives continues to shape new, practical 
concepts and pilots for future international climate policies such as the upcoming new 
mechanisms under Paris Agreement Article 6.2 and 6.4, sectoral approaches and up-scaled 
crediting mechanisms. Perspectives has supported governments and the private sector in 
engaging with emerging climate finance vehicles such as the Green Climate Fund, as well as 
developing innovative private sector engagement models e.g. through auctions for emission 
reductions and renewable energy. We are also actively engaged in the evolving discussions 
and UNFCCC negotiations around climate finance, linking of domestic carbon markets and 
provide methodological research on results-based performance indicators. Our support has 
contributed to developing Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and strategies for their 
implementation. Several of our past assignments explore the interconnections between 
NDCs, the international climate policy and the global carbon finance architecture. 
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Executive Summary  
Momentum is increasing globally for the implementation of carbon pricing as a means to 
cost-efficient climate mitigation. At the same time, carbon pricing, whether through an 
emissions trading system or a carbon tax, often faces contestation and public resistance. 
Against this backdrop, the present study investigates key aspects in policy design and 
carbon pricing communications that help build support for the policy and contribute to its 
longevity.  
In six case studies of carbon pricing initiatives from four continents, the study examines how 
policy design – including scope of coverage, price level and trajectory, and revenue usage – 
and communication – how it is talked about with different stakeholders and how central 
issues and concerns are addressed – interplayed with other factors and contributed to the 
success or failure of different carbon pricing policies. The case studies were chosen taking 
into account the significance of the policies, diversity of outcome, and geographical 
representation. 
Among the cases reviewed are the Swedish carbon tax, which is one of the earliest carbon 
taxes in the world and currently stands as the highest carbon price globally; the British 
Columbian carbon tax, which is the first in North America and one of the broadest worldwide; 
the Swiss carbon tax, which is relatively high by global standards and is known for its 
innovative revenue recycling through the health insurance system; the French carbon tax, 
whose opposition in the form of the Yellow Vest movement has captured much of the recent 
attention to carbon pricing; the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, which was repealed 
quickly after its introduction; and the Colombian carbon tax, which presents one of the first 
examples of carbon pricing in Latin America. 
While each of these cases provides unique lessons we systematically compare how different 
factors often considered relevant in the durability of carbon pricing policies play out across 
cases. Among other things, we find that that the French case diverges from more successful 
cases across a large number of relevant dimensions, providing a “perfect storm” for 
significant opposition. At the same time, the analysis also shows that there is no certain 
recipe for success. Also carbon pricing policies like the Australian Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism that are seemingly robust in terms of policy design and underpinned by a 
deliberate communications strategy can suffer quick defeat when the broader policy context 
is challenging. 
We conclude by combining insights from this study with prior work, deriving some lessons 
learned and providing recommendations for successful carbon pricing communication. In 
particular, we note the importance of good communication that is tailored to stakeholders but 
internally consistent, of testing messaging, of labelling policy instruments favourably 
(avoiding the often negative connotation of “tax” and emphasising positive environmental 
effects), of directing revenue toward the goal of the policy and addressing distributional 
issues, and of convincingly addressing concerns around fairness and carbon leakage. 
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Introduction 
 Carbon pricing is on the rise: The pricing of CO2 emissions – in particular through 
taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS) – is increasingly gaining importance as 
a central component of national mitigation strategies. Around 20%
1
 of global 
emissions are already covered by implemented or scheduled carbon pricing, and the 
trend is rising.  
 
 Ambitious policies are few and often face resistance: While carbon prices are 
often low compared to what is considered necessary to achieve the goals of the 
Paris Agreement
2
 some jurisdictions – e.g. Sweden, Switzerland and British 
Columbia – have moved forward with ambitious carbon prices. Furthermore, 
countries such as Colombia, Chile and Singapore are moving ahead with carbon 
pricing but have to-date kept prices very low. Others, such as France and Australia, 
have sought to introduce ambitious pricing but faced significant hurdles.  
 
 Good communication of carbon pricing is necessary: Importantly, the more 
significant carbon prices become, the more important good communication 
becomes to ensure continued political support. We thus focus on successful and 
less successful cases to gauge what can be learnt about communicating carbon 
prices. Beyond combining insights from these cases, we draw on existing work, 
particularly the “Guide to Communicating Carbon Pricing” (PMR & CLPC 2018). 
 
 Carbon prices are effective and have significant revenue generation potential: 
The pricing of CO2 emissions is generally considered to be an effective climate 
protection tool. Depending on the implementation, considerable government 
revenues can also be generated and used to finance climate protection projects; to 
underpin the transition to a sustainable economy and energy supply; or to 
compensate particularly affected and vulnerable groups. 
 
 Politics are challenging due to invisible benefits, but visible costs: Because a 
carbon tax works indirectly through changing economic incentives, it does not 
provide clearly visible benefits in a way that more direct policies, e.g. subsidies for 
home insulation, provide.  However, as it establishes an explicit price, the costs 
are very visible. This structure of partially invisible benefits combined with visible 
costs has historically made carbon prices vulnerable to strong political opposition.  
 
The persistence of carbon prices and increase of the tax rate is subject to 
country-specific factors: In Australia, France and the Canadian provinces of 
Ontario and Alberta, where carbon pricing was implemented or planned, strong and 
organized opposition has weakened, blocked or even reversed 
implementation. On the other hand, jurisdictions such as Switzerland and 
Sweden, as well as the Canadian province of British Columbia, have successfully 
introduced and strengthened carbon prices over long periods of time.  
 
 
1
 https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/ 
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1 Case study: Carbon pricing in Sweden 
1.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 The carbon tax in Sweden was introduced in 1991 as part of a comprehensive tax 
reform including a reform of energy taxation. It is levied as a tax on energy carriers by 
carbon content. Other energy taxes exist (e.g. to reduce other pollutants) as well as a 
historically high energy tax (incentivizing reduced energy use) levied by energy content 
(the energy tax). 
  Since then, it has been adjusted and increased several times. Simultaneously with the 
introduction of the carbon tax, the energy tax – levied by energy content rather than 
carbon – was reduced by 50 percent. 
 At the time of introduction, the carbon tax was around EUR 20/tCO2. It is currently at 
about EUR 114/tCO2. While about half of the tax revenue is allocated to the federal 
budget, the other half is utilised to finance energy-policy measures and income-tax 
reductions (Carl & Fedor, 2016; Swedish Government, 2019). 
 Sweden announced the design of the carbon tax early to hold public consultations in 
advance of legislative approval and the tax’s gradual increase. Thus, households as well 
as companies had sufficient time to prepare for the financial implications of the tax.  
 Stakeholder criticisms raised in advance included concerns about an increase in the 
overall tax burden as well as negative effects on industry and the economy. In 
addition, the effectiveness of Sweden's unilateral approach to solving a global problem 
(carbon emissions) was questioned (Scharin & Wallström, 2018).  
1.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
 In order to reduce the carbon tax’s effect on the poor, its introduction was accompanied by 
a simultaneous reduction of the energy tax and income taxes for low-income 
households.3 
 The carbon tax historically differentiated between a higher tax rate for end consumers 
(transport, heating) and a lower tax rate for industry to protect against carbon leakage. To 
further decarbonise and cushion the tax’s impact, complementary instruments – many of 
them preceding the carbon tax – have been promoted (such as district heating, bioenergy, 
building insulation, and improving the public transport infrastructure) across sectors. 
 The significant revenues from the carbon tax flow into the Swedish budget, from which 
funding is regularly made available to soften the burden of the carbon tax (e.g. in order to 
finance other climate-related measures and to address distributional issues).  
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1.3 Communication tools in the process, main issues and public 
responses 
 The design and implementation of the carbon tax resulted from a commission formed in 
1988 to explore economic instruments for environmental policy. The commission 
consisted of representatives of the political parties, the steel and petrochemical industries, 
the Swedish Farmers' Association, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, and the 
Swedish Environmental and Nature Conservation Agency (Scharin & Wallström, 2018). 
 In order to secure public support for the carbon tax, participation processes were carried 
out with various interest groups of Swedish society. Only after consulting the public, the 
bill was introduced in the parliament.  
 The carbon tax was introduced in 1991 as part of a comprehensive tax reform. This 
meant that the introduction of the carbon tax received limited attention by the general 
public (Scharin & Wallström, 2018). 
 The Swedish population overwhelmingly regards climate change as a real problem, which 
strengthened public acceptance for the measure. The bipartisan consensus on the 
carbon tax contributes to high public support as well. 
1.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
by political leaders 
 To avoid negative implications for industry and competitiveness the risk of carbon 
leakage was mitigated through exemptions and lower tax rates for emissions-
intensive industries and higher taxation of other sectors not threatened by leakage, in 
particular households, transport, and services (two-tier tax system). With the introduction 
of the EU ETS covering industry, industrial emissions were gradually completely 
exempted from the carbon tax to avoid double regulation. 
 The rising carbon tax burden was compensated by reducing other taxes such as the 
energy tax and income taxes (especially for low- and medium-income groups) (Åkerfeldt & 
Hammar, 2015). This helped to avoid an increase of the overall tax burden. 
 The Swedish government is cushioning the burden with countermeasures such as 
improved public transport infrastructure to avoid disproportionate burden on certain 
groups (e.g. car commuters).  
 To avoid the problem of limited access to low-carbon alternatives the availability of 
alternative options has been expanded to make the switch to low-carbon options more 
attractive (e.g. district heating). In addition, budget funds were used to further stimulate 
the transition (e.g. through incentives for the use of bioenergy, expansion of district 
heating, building insulation).  
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1.5 Lessons learnt from the Swedish case and possible implications 
for other contexts 
 The design of the carbon tax as well as embedding and linking it to a comprehensive tax 
reform are considered good practice. Furthermore, early stakeholder involvement 
proved to be successful in building trust and gaining support for the proposed policies 
(Scharin & Wallström, 2018). 
 By establishing feasible low-carbon alternatives, the government enabled consumers to 
actually respond to the price signal by switching to low-carbon alternatives. 
 If, as in Sweden, a high environmental awareness exists, a carbon tax can be better 
promoted to the public (World Bank, 2018).  
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2 Case study: Carbon pricing in Switzerland 
2.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 Under the CO2 act, enacted in 2000, the federal government can implement and increase 
a carbon incentive tax on fossil fuels if the national emission reduction targets are 
not reached through voluntary and other measures (Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und 
Landschaft, 2004). 
 The rate was set at CHF 12/tCO2 when the tax was introduced in 2008 and is increased 
as soon as a target shortfall is apparent. The carbon tax is capped at CHF 120/tCO2 
and is currently at CHF 96/tCO2 (Bundesamt für Umwelt, 2018a). 
 Fossil fuels for transport are explicitly excluded from the carbon tax in order to 
prevent a decline in fuel tourism and the associated revenue shortfall from the mineral oil 
tax. 
2.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
 The carbon tax is an incentive tax from which revenues must be redistributed to the 
population. This is done via compensation payments through the obligatory health 
insurance system. 
 This method was chosen because health insurers are in possession of the most up-to-
date address directory of all residents in Switzerland. Employers receive a 
compensation payment for the tax paid through the old-age and survivor's insurance 
(OASI), the compulsory pension system (Bundesamt für Umwelt, 2018b). 
 Since 2010, only two thirds of the revenues are returned to the population and the 
economy on a pro-rata basis, while around one third (capped at CHF 450 million) is 
earmarked for a programme for energy-efficient building refurbishment. An additional 
CHF 25 million per year goes to a fund for the promotion of low-emission 
technologies. 
 In 2018, all people in Switzerland covered by health insurance received a flat rate 
compensation payment of CHF 88.80. CHF 492 million were distributed to businesses, 
with each company getting back 1.475‰ of the pension payments made (Bundesamt für 
Umwelt, 2017b). 
2.3 Communication tools in the process, main issues and public 
responses 
 When it became clear in 2004 that the national mitigation targets would not be achieved in 
the absence of a tax, the exact modalities of the incentive tax had to be negotiated. 
Therefore, in 2004-2005, the established Swiss public consultation process on draft laws 
adelphi  Climate Focus  Perspectives Climate Group 007 
and regulations was held, a process where all relevant interest groups can comment 
on the drafts in writing. A consultation process took place again in 2009 before the 
revision of the CO2 act to set targets for 2020, and in 2017 to revise the act to set targets 
after 2020 (UVEK, 2005; Bundesamt für Umwelt, 2009; Bundesamt für Umwelt, 2017a). 
 Since 2004, when the modalities for the introduction of the tax were debated, the central 
element of public communication has been emphasising that the carbon tax is not a 
normal tax but an ecological incentive tax that rewards energy-efficient behaviour and 
sets corresponding incentives for the economy and individual energy consumption while, 
through the recycling of the revenue, not leading to a higher tax burden (Bundesamt für 
Energie, 2004). 
 Numerous interest groups were involved in the lengthy but very inclusive process for 
the development of the carbon tax. A first attempt to introduce such a tax failed in 1994 
due to opposition from interest groups, but the government stipulated the possibility of 
a carbon tax in the 2000 CO2 act. 
 The carbon tax was introduced in the CO2 act as a subsidiary (backstop) policy 
instrument that would only be applied in case the industry did not take appropriate 
measures to achieve Swiss mitigation goals. This “backstop” character is a central 
argument in the communication of the tax up to today, as companies can be exempt 
from it if they agree to binding emission-reduction targets with the government. 
 While the negotiation processes were very difficult, especially at the beginning, the 
carbon tax is now firmly established and, despite the recent failure to pass a revision of 
the CO2 act in parliament, it was not questioned in principle (Ingold & Varone, 2011). 
 In its public communication, the government emphasizes the redistribution of 
contributions made and, increasingly so, the earmarking part of revenues to promote 
environmentally friendly measures. 
 Studies of the early implementation have shown that only a small part of the population 
knew about the redistribution via health insurance premiums (Carrattini, Carvalho & 
Fankhauser, 2018). Since then, this fact has been communicated more proactively. 
Now every insured person receives a letter accompanying the health insurance 
statement titled “Why you receive XY francs”. The letter explains where the money 
comes from and why an environmental tax makes sense and benefits the population. 
Further, it explains that the levies are redistributed back to the population (i.e. not the 
same as general taxes) and are paid out by the health insurance funds (Bundesamt für 
Umwelt, 2017b). 
 According to a study undertaken in 2016, the key success factor for political acceptability 
is not to reduce the tax burden per se, but to earmark it for specific environmental 
purposes and per-capita flat rates. The study argued that redistributing revenue for non-
environmental purposes would be more difficult to communicate to the population 
(Bundesamt für Energie, 2016). This coincides with the experience of a very clearly 
rejected referendum in 2015 on the introduction of a general carbon tax as a substitute for 
the value-added tax. 
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2.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
by political leaders 
 A significant compromise in the negotiation of the incentive tax was the exception for 
transport fuels. In return, the association of fuel importers/distributors (Erdölvereinigung) 
committed to introduce the Climate Cent, a levy of CHF 0.015 /L of fuel. The proceeds 
were used to purchase emission-reduction certificates from Switzerland and abroad in 
order to close the gap between the voluntary measures and the mitigation targets of the 
CO2 law (Brönnimann et al., 2014). 
 An expansion of the carbon tax to fuels was also discussed again in the course of 
negotiations on the revision of the CO2 act, but it did not find majority support. Likewise, a 
majority of business representatives insists that the levy should continue to apply only 
as a subsidiary instrument when agreed emission targets are not met. 
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3 Case study: Carbon pricing in British Columbia 
3.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 As part of a series of climate initiatives, British Columbia introduced a carbon tax on circa 
70 percent of its emissions in 2008 (Murray & Rivers, 2015). The carbon tax was 
designed as a revenue-neutral policy, which guaranteed the redistribution of its revenue to 
the public and the economy through tax credits for the public and tax breaks for the 
economy (Ministry of Finance British Columbia, 2008). This was the core message 
behind the communications strategy. 
 The predictability of how the price would develop was a key factor in its implementation: 
Starting with CAD 10/tCO2 the tax would be increased by CAD 5/tCO2 annually to reach 
CAD 30/tCO2 by 2012 (Ministry of Finance British Columbia, 2018). Popular support for 
the tax increased over the time of its implementation (see below).  
 The absence of a national or regional carbon pricing system led the liberal provincial 
government to freeze the price of carbon in 2013 until other provinces or the national 
government would introduce carbon pricing schemes of their own (Pembina Institute, 
2014). A change in the provincial government and the national Pan-Canadian Framework 
on Clean Growth and Climate Change led to the re-introduction of the annual price 
increase in April 2018. Since April 2019 the carbon tax is CAD 40/tCO2 and is expected to 
rise to CAD 50/tCO2 in 2021 (Ministry of Finance British Columbia, 2018). 
3.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
 The communications strategy centers around the revenue-neutral component of the 
carbon tax. This includes:  
- The reduction of the income and trade taxes. 
- “Climate Action Tax Credits” are distributed four times a year to low-
income households. The amount depends on the number of household 
members and the net income of each household. For the period July-
October 2018, beneficiaries received CAD 135, as well as CAD 135 for their 
spouse/partner, and an additional CAD 40 per child. Single parents received 
CAD 135 for their first child. These policy aspects establish the carbon tax 
as a progressive tax and make positive cash flows visible to the public 
(Beck, Rivers, Wigle, & Yonezawa, 2015; Lammam & Jackson, 2017). 
 Tax cuts and subsidies introduced in the past years for the agricultural sector and rural 
communities have led to the net tax burden dropping to zero.  
 The reintroduction of the yearly tax increases also aims to strengthen redistribution in 
such a way that half of the population of British Columbia can benefit from it. In addition to 
the reintroduction, the Climate Action Tax Credits were increased and a “Clean BC 
Program” launched to maintain industry competitiveness while encouraging new green 
initiatives. The Clean BC Program for Industry directs an amount equal to the 
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incremental carbon tax paid by industry above $30/ton into incentives for cleaner 
operations that reduce the tax for companies that can prove to meet low-carbon 
benchmarks as well as an industry fund to support emission reduction projects (British 
Columbia, 2019).   
3.3 Communication tools, main issues and public responses 
 The high level of environmental awareness among the public, the low-emissions 
energy system and the centre-right government with close ties to industry, as well as the 
personal commitment expressed by the prime minister, were factors that contributed to a 
favourable political context for the introduction of a carbon tax (Clean Energy Canada, 
2014). However, scepticism among industry and low-income and rural populations had 
first to be overcome.  
 The government emphasized in its communication that the carbon tax would not have any 
negative impacts on the province’s economic growth. It also made clear that the overall 
tax burden would not rise due to the carbon tax. The government used terms such as 
price on pollution and incentive to reduce pollution instead of tax, as studies indicated this 
would be more easily accepted by the public (Carattini, Carvalho & Fankhauser, 2018).  
 The government also indicated in its budget planning that the tax would function as a 
market signal to reduce emissions. In order to appease voters’ fears that redistributive 
measures could be phased out, it mandated the Ministry of Finance to submit yearly three-
year plans on how to best redistribute revenues (Ministry of Finance British Columbia, 
2008). 
 Surveys indicate that the early concerns brought by the public were addressed to their 
satisfaction, leading to a high popularity of the carbon tax among citizens (Carattini, 
Carvalho & Fankhauser, 2018).  
3.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
by political leaders 
 Public approval of the carbon tax rose despite the tax tripling between 2008 and 2012 
(Murray & Rivers, 2015). By 2011, the majority of the population approved it. Bipartisan 
support for the tax was maintained after the 2013 election. Focusing on social aspects 
in the communication strategy contributed to the significant approval of the policy 
(Carattini, Carvalho & Fankhauser, 2018). 
 Further measures were adopted over time to address the scepticism of certain groups of 
the population and industry. Since 2009, homeowners in the north of the province and in 
rural areas have been receiving annual grants to compensate increased heating costs. 
The agricultural sector has benefited from certain tax exemptions since 2013. 2013 also 
saw the increase in carbon price suspended, as a reaction to the pressure applied by 
industry, which claimed the tax had become a burden in the face of strong international 
competition (Clean Energy Canada, 2014). 
 In order to prevent this kind of criticism in the future, the government introduced, along 
with the carbon price increase in 2018, an increase of the Climate Action Tax Credit and 
introduced the Clean BC Program for industries (British Columbia, 2019). This support 
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was justified by the government as a way to avoid carbon leakage. Companies which 
meet their sector’s global benchmark of low carbon intensity are granted exemptions from 
the carbon tax. Tax revenues are also allocated for the promotion of low-emissions 
technology use. 
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4 Case study: Carbon pricing in Australia 
4.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 The Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) was introduced in Australia as part of a federal 
legislation in 2011. It consisted of a hybrid scheme that incorporated elements of both 
emissions trading schemes and carbon prices. It included a transition period for its first 
three years, during which the carbon price was fixed at AUD 23 (USD 20.39) (resembling 
a carbon tax), meaning that entities covered by the scheme had to pay a set carbon price 
per ton of CO2-eq emitted. The carbon pricing scheme would then transition to a full ETS 
with the carbon price determined by supply and demand for carbon units (Australian 
Government, 2011).  
 The scope of the mechanism covered electricity generation, industry, waste and fugitive 
emissions, making it one of the most comprehensive carbon prices adopted to date. In 
total, the mechanism covered around 60 percent of domestic emissions and imposed 
obligations on over 350 large emitters. It was also one of the few mechanisms that 
targeted downstream emissions (i.e. price set at the point emissions are released into 
the atmosphere) with a threshold of 25,000 tCO2. Moreover, the CPM included provisions 
to use offsets generated domestically and internationally (Australian Government, 2011). 
 While all major parties generally supported a national carbon pricing policy until 2009, 
Australia’s Liberal Party dropped its support in 2009, at the same time the international 
negotiations in Copenhagen failed to deliver a new climate agreement (Peel, 2014). 
Political turmoil followed in Australia, where both the prime minister and opposition leader, 
both of whom had until then pushed for an ETS, were replaced. The Labour Party 
leader, Julia Gillard, won the 2010 elections, promising during her campaign that she 
would not support a carbon tax. However, to form a government, Labour joined a coalition 
with the Greens. A key condition on this deal was the introduction of a carbon price (Peel, 
2014). The Australian opposition proceeded to lead a campaign of strong opposition 
that was backed by large swaths of the media and was a key factor in the opposition’s 
success in the 2014 election and subsequent repeal of the carbon price (World Bank, 
2018). 
4.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
 In order to reduce the financial burden of the CPM on the cost of living, the government 
assigned over half of the mechanism’s revenue to social measures to support households. 
As part of a ‘household assistance package’ (HAP) implemented alongside the CPM, 
tax reform measures, allowances and benefits, as well as flat payments were introduced. 
These flat payments consisted of direct financial transfers to vulnerable groups, including 
low- and middle-income households and pensioners, meant to compensate the increased 
cost of living associated with the CPM. Another 40 percent of the revenue went towards 
supporting job creation, targeting emissions-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries (EITE) in particular. Moreover, the government also allocated funds to 
encourage innovation in clean energy and improve energy efficiency (Australian 
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Government, 2011). Finally, part of the revenue was allocated to the purchase of offsets 
and to the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (a green bank) (PMR & CPLC, 2017). 
4.3 Communication tools in the process, main issues and public 
responses 
 The main communications tools used by the Australian government were extensive 
consultations, careful naming of the policy and a media campaign. Moreover, the 
government used economic modelling exercises to provide a strong evidence base for its 
messaging. 
 The use of the term CPM aimed to reflect the hybrid nature of the policy. However, this 
was not clearly captured, as the complex nature of the carbon tax contributed to it not 
being easily communicated in simple terms. This is particularly true for the transition 
period that featured a fixed price resembling a carbon tax. While both politicians and 
economists communicated that the CPM was technically not a tax, the opposition’s 
repeated framing of the mechanism as a tax, and the general distrust of the public in 
experts, reinforced this notion among the public and the media (World Bank, 2018). 
- While the CPM was officially a hybrid system that would ultimately transition to 
an ETS, the early opposition to the carbon pricing instrument, primarily led by 
the Liberal Party, allowed opponents to influence the narrative. They quickly 
dubbed the CPM as a “carbon tax” and a “tax on everything”. 
- During the 2013 federal election, liberal leader Tony Abbot famously 
campaigned with the slogan: “Axe the Tax”. This contributed to the proponents 
of the CPM taking a defensive strategy of claiming the policy was not a tax. 
 A million-dollar advertisement and social media campaign, which included the celebrity 
actor Cate Blanchett, sought to bring public support for the CPM. This campaign was not 
tested with the public before being rolled out, however, and was heavily criticized by the 
Liberal party and the press (Pearse, 2017). The government did not foresee the 
mechanism being associated with wider issues of trust, elitism, and legitimacy (World 
Bank, 2018).  
 The Australian government undertook extensive modelling to examine the relationship 
between carbon price levels, abatement outcomes and impact on households. The results 
of this exercise were used to support government messaging around the relatively low 
impact of the CPM on households, and how these impacts were being addressed through 
the HAP (World Bank, 2018). However, this approach had relatively limited impact in 
the face of intense media criticism centred on the costs of the scheme, with opinion 
polls indicating Australians in fact overestimated the impact of the CPM on energy costs 
(McGuirk et al., 2014).   
 The design and communication of the policy also involved significant political discussions, 
including extensive expert- and public consultations (Peel, 2014). However, a proposal 
by the Prime Minister to discuss the carbon price in a citizens’ assembly before its 
introduction was opposed by politicians who claimed it could undermine the parliament.  
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4.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
by political leaders 
 Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism was a well-designed policy which reflected many 
years of policy development (Jotzo, 2012). Nonetheless, the policy faced intense and 
sustained criticism from the opposition and key sections of the media, in particular 
publications owned by the conservative News Corporation Australia, which accounts for 
57 percent of daily newspaper circulation (Molineaux et al., 2016). Criticisms from these 
groups frequently focused on the alleged impacts the policy would have on ordinary 
Australians, though they also included outright denial of climate change and therefore of 
the relevance of the CPM (Tranter & Booth, 2014). 
 While the government sought to challenge these criticisms, the intensity and consistency 
of the attacks coupled with the absence of a comprehensive communications strategy 
meant it was often in the defense and therefore not in a position to set the terms of the 
debate. An early and sustained campaign with honest and simple messaging framing the 
CPM as a mechanism that made big polluters pay for their environmental damage 
while protecting ordinary Australians through the HAP may have preempted the 
opposition’s framing of the mechanism as a “great big tax on everything”).    
 Moreover, the government failed to anticipate concerns and misinformation early on in the 
process (World Bank, 2018). This contributed to advocates facing an uphill struggle to 
defend the policy, as well as a growing division on the issue between parties and the 
public. An example of this was how opponents blamed carbon pricing for increasing 
electricity prices despite the carbon price not being the main driver. The government 
found it difficult to successfully challenge this assertion (World Bank, 2018). In reality, the 
main driver behind the increasing electricity prices was the cost of extra investments in the 
ageing electricity distribution infrastructure. 
 The legislation that introduced the CPM was passed by a minority Labour government 
supported by the Greens party and independent Members of Parliament (Jotzo, 2012). 
This may also have increased the unstable position of the policy, indicating the challenges 
of sustaining a carbon price without broad-based political support.  
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5 Case study: Carbon pricing in France 
5.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 In 2014, a carbon tax in France was introduced by then-President François Hollande as 
a surcharge to existing taxes in the non-ETS sectors, starting at a rate of EUR 7/tCO2 and 
reaching EUR 30.5/tCO2 in 2017. To align with the French target to cut fossil-fuel 
consumption by 40% by 2030 (compared to 1990 baseline), the carbon tax scheduled to 
reach EUR 100/tCO2 in 2030. 
 The carbon tax is technically not a new tax but a price component (Contribution Climat-
Énergie, CEE) added to three existing domestic consumption taxes, namely the taxes 
on fuels (Taxe Intérieure de Consommation sur les Produits Energétiques, TICPE), on 
heating gas (Taxe Intérieure de Consommation sur le Gaz Naturel, TICGN) and on coal 
(Taxe Intérieure de Consommation sur le Charbon, TICC). They apply to households as 
well as companies in the non-ETS sectors. 
 The carbon component was initially to be annually increased up to EUR 39/tCO2 in 2018 
and EUR 47.5/tCO2 in 2019. After President Emmanuel Macron came into office in 2017, 
he accelerated the planned rate of increase to EUR 44.6/tCO2 in 2018 and EUR 
55/tCO2 in 2019 (IPP, 2018).  
 In 2015, overall taxes on gasoline amounted to roughly EUR 275/tCO2 and roughly 
EUR 175/tCO2 on diesel. These totals combine all existing taxes on domestic 
consumption as well as the carbon tax introduced in 2014 (OECD, 2018). 
 In 2017, the French carbon component translated to a surcharge of EUR 0.07/L on 
gasoline and EUR 0.08/L on diesel, with gasoline priced at EUR 1.37/L and diesel priced 
at EUR 1.24/L on average in 2017, corresponding to 5.4% and 6% of the total price 
respectively. The projected tax increase of TICPE for 2019 would have raised the gasoline 
price by an additional EUR 0.04/L (+ 2.7% on the average price of  EUR 1.47/L in 2019) 
and the diesel price by EUR 0.07/L (+ 4.8% on the average price of EUR 1.45/L in 2019). 
This 2019 increase would have reduced the carbon-taxation differential between gasoline 
and diesel.  
 However, responding to protests of the Yellow Vests movement (Gilets Jaunes), the 
government first postponed the planned increase of the carbon tax for six months in 
December 2018 and later suspended it for 2019 (The New York Times, 2018). 
5.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
a) Use of revenue:  
 From 2014 until 2017, carbon-tax revenue was mostly used to increase employment 
and competitiveness of companies (through the Crédit d'Impôt pour la Compétitivité et 
l'Emploi, CICE) and to finance the energy transition (e.g. by providing incentives for 
electric vehicles). Of the EUR 5.4 billion of carbon tax revenues in 2017,  EUR 1.7 billion 
were earmarked to finance the energy transition, while the remaining EUR 3.7 billion 
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were used for the CICE. The additional revenue increase projected for the tax rise in 2019 
was not earmarked to further finance the energy transition.  
 There was very limited awareness among taxpayers on the earmarking of the carbon tax 
due to a lack of clear communication. Regarding the planned 2018 tax hike, there was 
criticism of the fact that most of the additional revenues from the accelerated tax-rate 
increase would flow to the national budget instead of the French départements and 
regions (Agora Energiewende, 2019). 
 In 2017, the Macron government introduced some social cushioning measures, ranging 
from an electric vehicle conversion premium to financial support for low-income 
households’ energy bills and funding for home insulation with a focus on low-income 
households, yet these did not alleviate burdens in the transport sector (see below) 
(French Government, 2017).  
 
b) Fairness issues and perceptions and the rise of the Yellow Vest movement:  
 Even after revenue recycling, the carbon tax has been shown to disproportionately 
burden low- and middle-income households since they spend a larger share of their 
income on fuels (regressive) (IPP, 2018). 
 The decision of the Macron government to increase the carbon tax coincided with an 
increase in oil prices in 2018, spiking in October 2018 Together with simultaneous 
cuts to welfare benefits and the wealth tax, this added to a general perception of rising 
social inequality and led to the eruption of the Yellow Vest protests in October 2018 
(Agora Energiewende, 2019).  
 The focus of the Yellow Vest movement was on the proposed increases on gasoline and 
diesel taxes (for which only few social cushioning measures were in place) and on the 
numerous exemptions from the carbon tax, e.g. for air and goods traffic as well as 
farmers, which added to a general perception of rising social inequality. Protests were 
intense and have been extensively covered in the global media. 
 The Yellow Vests movement especially appealed to low-income households in the 
countryside and small towns.  
 More generally, pensioners and the rural population are considered to be hit the 
hardest by the earlier Macron reform package of 2017, while the richest one percent 
gained significantly (IPP, 2019). This, together with the decisions to cut wealth taxes and 
social benefits in the 2019 budget gave rise to an increasing perception of social 
injustice. President Macron was dubbed the “president of the rich” (The Guardian, 
2018). 
5.3 Communication tools in the process, main issues and public 
responses 
 When introducing the carbon tax in 2014, no public consultation process took place. There 
was also no specific communication effort by the government regarding the planned 
carbon tax increase. 
 In response to the Yellow Vest protests and the resulting political turmoil, President 
Macron launched a “Grand Débat National” (15 January  – 15 March, 2019), a large-
scale public consultation process throughout France, offering citizens a platform to 
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participate and express their opinions. One main topic was the “ecological 
transition” (la transition écologique). With more than 10,000 local gatherings and 1.5 
million individual contributions, it generated a vast amount of data on public perceptions of 
the carbon price (French Government, 2019). 
5.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
by political leaders 
 During the “Grand Débat National”, key points of criticism regarding the carbon tax have 
been the lack of transparency in revenue recycling and concerns of rising social 
injustice, especially in rural areas (“we have to pay more for gasoline, while the rich fly 
without paying taxes”). 
 Moreover, citizens raised the issue that big companies and several subsectors (e.g. 
aviation, freight, agriculture) are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary citizens due to several 
exemptions in place.  
 In March 2019, 19 civil society organisations and trade unions proposed a “social and 
ecological pact”, demanding both the redistribution of all carbon tax revenue to 
households as well as financing the renewable-energy transition (CFDT, 2019). 
 As a response to the results of the “Grand Débat National” published in April 2019, 
President Macron announced several tax cuts for the middle class and no further 
increases to the carbon tax (The Washington Post, 2019). 
5.5 Lessons learnt from the French case and possible implications for 
other contexts 
 The increase of the carbon tax coincided with an extensive reform package perceived as 
socially unjust and lacking compensatory measures, leading to public opposition.  
 Instead of using tax revenues only for national budget priorities, putting a strong 
emphasis on compensating measures for citizens would have likely led to greater 
political and social acceptance. Social cushioning measures should be focused on target 
groups that are most exposed to the carbon tax and communicated in a transparent and 
clear way.  
 When carbon prices are raised, low-carbon alternatives should be made easily 
accessible for both companies and individuals in order to secure public acceptance. This 
could be observed in France where – through electric heating and low-carbon electricity – 
the heating sector is much more decarbonized than the transport sector. Consequently, 
citizens are considerably less exposed to carbon prices in the heating sector than in the 
transport sector. While the Yellow Vests protests were primarily directed at rising transport 
fuel prices, the increasing prices for fuel-based heating systems have not been an issue of 
public concern.  
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6 Case study: Carbon pricing in Colombia 
6.1 Introduction and development of the carbon tax 
 Colombia introduced a national carbon tax in 2016 within the context of a broader 
structural reform of the revenue collection system. The tax entered into force in 2017 
(MADS, 2017). 
 The carbon tax is applied to the sales and imports of all fossil fuels except for coal. It 
covers 16% of Colombia’s total greenhouse gas emissions (Carbon Trust, EDF & 
IETA, 2018). 
 The tax is levied on domestic fuel sales, fuel extraction for self-consumption, and fuel 
import. It is only imposed once, depending on whichever action occurs first (MADS, 2017). 
 Colombia’s carbon tax corresponds to a rate of COP 15,000/tCO2 (approximately USD 
5/tCO2). It is set to increase annually by 1% plus inflation until the rate reaches 
approximately USD 10/tCO2 (Government of Colombia, 2016, Art. 221). 
 The expected tax revenues are approximately USD 220 million per year (Carbon Trust et 
al., 2018). In 2017, the revenues from the carbon tax were COP 477 billion (approximately 
USD 142 million) and in 2018 COP 294 billion (approximately USD 87 million) 
(Minihacienda, 2019). Tax revenue is thus significantly below expectations. 
6.2 Distributional as well as fairness issues and corresponding 
solutions 
 In order to reduce the tax burden on companies and to stimulate investments in 
emissions-mitigation activities, entities can achieve partial or total exemption by submitting 
carbon offset certificates that conform to specific criteria (Government of Colombia, 2017). 
As a result, 3.6 million Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) generated under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) were voluntarily cancelled in close to 400 transactions 
for projects in Colombia (UNFCCC, 2019). 
 Revenues of the carbon tax are distributed as follows: 25% for adaptation financing, 
specifically to reduce coastal erosion, conserving strategic ecosystems, and water 
sources conservation; 5% to the National System of Protected Areas; and 70% to 
finance post-conflict actions (Government of Colombia, 2018a, Art. 26). Initially, 
revenues were channeled through the Fund for Sustainable Environment and Rural 
Sustainable Development (Government of Colombia, 2016). However, in 2018, the Peace 
Fund of Colombia was defined as the main recipient, receiving 70% of the revenues. 
Its objective is to support the Final Agreement of Peace (Acuerdo Final de la Paz) of 2017 
through the substitution of crops, local development plans, and general social 
development programs (Government of Colombia, 2018b). 
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6.3 Communication tools in the process, main issues and public 
responses 
 In Colombia, public and private stakeholder participation is secured through the National 
System of Climate Change (SISCLIMA), which assembles state, private, and non-profit 
entities (Carbon Trust et al., 2018).  
 The carbon tax introduction was carried out as part of a major tax reform with the goal to 
increase tax revenues that were under pressure due to a fall in oil-tax revenues. The 
reform included inter alia an increase of VAT by 3% and the introduction of a withholding 
tax for foreign activities in Colombia (Government of Colombia, 2016; MADS, 2017). In 
this context, little debate about the carbon tax, set at a low rate, took place.  
 The government stated that the tax should bolster national efforts to reduce CO2 
emissions, discourage the utilisation of fossil fuels, and promote more efficient 
technologies in order to achieve the commitments made under the Paris Agreement 
(MADS, 2017; Government of Colombia, 2015). 
6.4 Criticism / concerns of different stakeholders and consideration 
during tax implementation 
 When the carbon tax was proposed in 2016, leaders from different industrial groups 
expressed their concerns of additional costs for the final consumers and reduction of 
demand. Fuel-association leaders considered that consumers and distributors would be 
gravely affected with the increase in gasoline prices (El País, 2016). 
 Powerful interests linked to coal mining managed to push through an exemption of coal. 
But coal exemption perversely incentivises an increase in coal consumption and mining 
activities. The Colombian Association of Natural Gas (Naturgas) requested the inclusion of 
coal in the carbon tax (El Heraldo, 2019). 
 The shift in revenues towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement has prompted 
criticism, as it is seen by various experts as a diversion of revenues compared to the 
main original objective of the tax, which was to support a fund for environmental 
protection activities in the wider context of the peace process but was then subsumed by 
the general Fondo Colombia en Paz (Cavalier, 2018; CO2CERO, 2017; Correa, 2018; El 
Tiempo, 2018; Pardo Ibarra, 2018). 
6.5 Lessons learnt from the Colombian case and possible 
implications for other contexts 
 The inclusion of the carbon tax in a comprehensive tax reform allowed supporters to “hide” 
it in the large package and reduce opposition.  
 Flexibility on how to comply with the tax through offsets motivates project developers to 
support the tax and, ideally, create new mitigation potentials through new offset projects. 
However, much larger submission of offsets than expected led to the need to protect tax 
revenues and reduce offset eligibility. 
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 New offset projects have been developed as a consequence of the introduction of 
the carbon tax. An example is the implementation of a reforestation program by CEMEX 
to neutralize the carbon emissions produced by their vehicle fleet (Correa, 2017). 
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7 Comparative Analysis of Case Studies 
 Systematic comparison across common elements: As a basis for drawing conclusions 
and recommendations, Table 1 below provides a summary of the case studies. It does so 
by providing nine different elements that have been identified as potentially relevant for 
carbon pricing durability in the case studies, four related to carbon tax design and five 
related to carbon tax communication. 
 Common elements, not success factors: By presenting these elements, we are not 
implying that they are “success factors” necessary and/or sufficient for carbon prices to 
succeed. Rather, the goal of the table is to outline possible elements (or combinations 
thereof) that might be important in driving carbon price durability. 
 Presence/Absence of elements in cases: For each carbon price, we classify whether a 
given element has been present in a given case –  on a scale from “strongly present” to 
“not present at all” with two intermediary stages. 
 A starting point for analysis: This provides a starting point for analysis, but should not 
be taken as a final result. 
 In this perspective, important Carbon Pricing Design elements seem to be: 
o Is the tax designed to avoid excessive costs for heavily affected sub-
populations (e.g. rural populations or populations with increased needs for 
heating, etc.)? 
This is a salient feature in many jurisdictions that is thought to be important to 
mitigate the impact on heavily affected populations that may otherwise 
oppose the policy.  
o Does the carbon price visibly return revenue to the general population, 
targeting specifically the general population and not only heavily affected 
groups? Returning (part of) the revenue directly to citizens is a component of 
many carbon prices and often heralded as a key driver of the political 
feasibility of a revenue-neutral carbon price(see for example Gabriel, 2019). 
o Is the carbon pricing revenue used to actively promote low-carbon 
alternatives, making it easier to ‘avoid’ paying the carbon price and adopt 
low-carbon behaviour? Opinion polls frequently find strong public support for 
linking the use of revenue to the overall objectives of the policy, and in 
particular for directing it to support low-carbon alternatives (see 8.3). 
o Are low-carbon substitution options available independent of how carbon 
pricing revenue is used (i.e. the general resource endowment, prior policies 
etc.)? The ability to avoid paying the carbon price switching to low-carbon 
alternatives is often considered important for policy acceptability, making it an 
important dimension to consider (see e.g. Ackva & Hoppe, 2018). The 
availability of such options varies widely across jurisdictions and sectors. 
 Potential Carbon Pricing Communication elements are: 
o Is the carbon price embedded in a wider tax reform?Some carbon price 
introductions have been part of major tax reforms and this is sometimes 
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brought forward as a potential success factor (e.g. in Sweden, see Ackva & 
Hoppe, 2018) as the carbon price “hides” within broader changes and the 
wider tax reform offers the opportunity of not increasing costs of important 
products (e.g. by offsetting a carbon price introduction with a reduction of a 
general energy tax). 
o Is the carbon price embedded in the wider climate policy effort to enable 
policy makers to communicate more clearly its relevance for climate 
protection? 
This is sometimes argued to be important, framing the carbon price as related 
to achieving shared social values (climate protection) and/or supporting other 
popular initiatives/technologies (e.g. renewables, electric mobility)  (see 8.3). 
o Has there been an active communication on how distributional issues 
are addressed? 
The active communication on measures to address distributional concerns 
has sometimes been found to be important for political acceptability (see 8.6).  
o Has there been a systematic stakeholder engagement process? This can 
possibly increase public acceptability both through increasing legitimacy and 
through addressing critical concerns in the policy design phase (see 8.2). 
o Is the tax labelled as a tax or is it labelled differently? This might be 
relevant for the public perception of the tax given that taxes can be perceived 
quite negatively in some contexts (see 8.4). 
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This analysis reveals some interesting patterns: 
 The French case is quite different from many of the other jurisdictions’ experiences, 
varying along many elements of carbon pricing design and communication. A lack of 
clearly visible revenue recycling, the difficulty of avoiding the tax in the transport sector 
(lack of low-carbon alternatives), inadequate compensation measures, as well as 
simultaneous wealth tax cuts and the oil price peak led to the divergent experience of 
France compared to more successful carbon pricing jurisdictions. Given the multitude of 
design and communication problems, the French case serves as a “perfect storm” 
example of an unsuccessful case, where it is difficult to relate the lack of success to a 
single factor. 
 Australia’s carbon pricing design and communication is more similar to some of the 
successful jurisdictions, showing that even a well-designed carbon pricing instrument can 
be derailed in the context of a highly fossil-fuel driven economy and an unfavourable 
political climate. 
 All successful carbon tax jurisdictions considered pay at least some attention to avoiding 
excessive cost for socially vulnerable populations. 
 All successful carbon tax jurisdictions with significant tax rates (i.e. excluding the 
Colombian case) have some form of returning revenues to the general population, often 
very visibly (e.g. in the case of British Columbia and Switzerland). 
 Successful carbon taxes have been implemented in the context of wider tax reforms, but 
also independently. 
 While language around “taxation” has sometimes been avoided, this is not always the 
case. Many successful carbon taxes are referred to as such, e.g. the Swedish but also the 
British Columbian one. Whether or not “taxation” is a loaded term that needs active 
avoiding is dependent on the specific context and political discourse. 
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8 Lessons learned 
While carbon pricing remains in relatively early stages of development in many jurisdictions, 
existing experiences already provide a wealth of valuable lessons that can help governments 
and other carbon pricing supporters in building and maintaining support for their expansion. 
This chapter brings together the main insights that these initial experiences offer to future 
endeavours, both on designing policies to win support and on getting communications and 
outreach right. In addition to the six case studies included in this paper, it draws on existing 
publications on the topic, and in particular the Guide to Communicating Carbon Pricing, 
written by Climate Outreach and Climate Focus for the World Bank (PMR & CPLC 2018).   
8.1 The importance of integrating policy and communications 
 Strong communication is key to gaining and maintaining support for carbon prices. 
Good communication is, in turn, built upon trust and credibility. This can only be 
achieved where the arguments used to justify the carbon price are coherent with the 
underlying policy. 
 Strong communications should therefore go hand in hand with a well-designed 
underlying policy – the carbon prices that have enjoyed significant longevity have 
successfully addressed both these elements.  
o Early criticisms of the carbon tax in Sweden, for example, have centred on 
the policy flaws such as the absence of low-carbon alternatives to taxed 
fuels, which may undermine the effectiveness of the policy in reducing 
emissions. Addressing these concerns was important for the policy’s 
acceptance.   
o In France, criticism has additionally focused on distributional implications and 
the social framing since the policy was connected with tax reductions for the 
rich and the carbon tax hitting rural/poor populations. Conversely, the 
Australian experience illustrates how communications failures coupled with a 
hostile political and media environment can further contribute to the downfall 
of a policy that is well designed. 
 Targeted and well-communicated revenue use is a powerful strategy for winning 
support. In Switzerland, the revenues from the carbon tax are distributed back to 
population and companies, in other jurisdictions such as British Columbia and Australia, a 
re-distribution approach was chosen that targets more vulnerable parts of the population. 
In Switzerland and British Columbia, a part of the revenues is used to promote 
environmentally friendly technologies and support the transformation of industry.  
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8.2 Communications and stakeholder engagement as an integral part 
of the policy-making process 
 A transparent and inclusive policy process in which stakeholders have the 
opportunity to engage in a meaningful way is central to ensuring broad acceptance 
of carbon pricing. This contributed to the successful communication in Sweden and 
Switzerland. In France, in contrast, the absence of a consultation process in designing the 
carbon tax at least appears to have contributed to an overall rejection by the public. 
 All carbon prices assessed in this study have been subject to significant criticism 
and in two cases this has led to the policies being repealed (Australia) or scaled 
back (France). Integrating communications throughout the policy-making process can 
help identify and address potential sources of opposition and lines of attack, as well as to 
develop, test and adjust messaging, ensure coherence between policy and messaging, 
and to build alliances with trusted communicators. 
8.3 The central role of tailored and tested narratives 
 Different narratives may be needed for different audiences, but they must be 
coherent. There is a wide range of stakeholders that need to be brought on board if a 
carbon price is to gain acceptance. Many of these have different priorities. It is important 
to adapt lines of argument for these different stakeholders, to match their chief concerns 
and priorities. Nonetheless, it is crucial to ensure coherence between the different 
arguments used. The government can consider developing a “meta-narrative”, that 
defines its overall argumentation for the carbon price, and various “sub-narratives”, that 
define its argumentation for each specific stakeholder group. 
 Carbon pricing can be more positively perceived if it is part of a comprehensive 
climate strategy. In Sweden, for instance, the carbon tax was introduced as part of a 
package of energy, transport, and climate reforms, which supported the government’s 
arguments that the tax was a key part of a broader strategy and not simply a revenue 
raising measure. Similarly, in Switzerland, the presentation of the carbon tax as a fall-back 
instrument where industry failed to take alternative measures to reach climate goals, 
coupled with earmarking part of the revenue for environmental projects, was well received. 
The latter point is consistent with studies indicating the public tends to favour the use of 
carbon pricing revenue for environmental purposes, as this is seen as consistent with the 
goals of the policy (Carattini, Carvalho, & Fankhauser, 2018; Kotchen, Turk, & 
Leiserowitz, 2017). 
 Focusing on non-climate benefits may be more tangible. The general public can have 
difficulties understanding what a carbon price is and how it is linked to climate change. A 
policy instrument which is associated with more tangible benefits that people can see, 
such as clean air, electric mobility, energy efficiency and green jobs - may be more likely 
to be accepted than one that is primarily presented as a way to address climate change. 
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8.4 What’s in a name? Getting the label right 
 The name or label given to the carbon price to the public must be well thought out 
and have a positive undertone. An early strategy on how to communicate the complexity 
of the mechanism in simple messages is key. The government of British Columbia for 
instance, favoured the term ‘price on pollution’ or ‘incentive to reduce pollution’, rather 
than talking about a tax. The Swiss use of the term Lenkungsabgabe (i.e. incentive tax) 
was also well-received as it communicated that the policy was not an ordinary tax, but one 
designed to incentivise mitigation.  
 Formally labelling a carbon price in a given way may not by itself be enough to 
ensure public support. Governments must also seize and keep hold of the popular 
narrative around the policy. In Australia, despite the government’s naming and 
consistently referring to the policy as the Carbon Pricing Mechanism, the colloquial names 
used by the opposition and large swaths of the media (“carbon tax”; “tax on everything”) 
caught on, pushing the government into a defensive position where they were debating on 
the opposition’s terms. The challenges in retaining control of the narrative were partially 
due to the complex design of the policy, whose hybrid character was difficult to 
understand by the public and whose initial similarity to a carbon tax complicated efforts to 
rebut the claim it was a tax. 
8.5 Addressing leakage, competitiveness and international action 
 Governments need to rebut claims of economic impacts, loss of competitiveness, 
and leakage: In the cases studied, private sector stakeholders typically justify their 
opposition to a carbon price in terms of potential negative impacts on the economy as a 
whole, loss of competitiveness in specific industries, or leakage of emissions to other 
jurisdictions. Addressing these concerns and rebutting these claims is crucial for ensuring 
support for the carbon price. 
 There is a range of arguments governments can use to counter these claims, but 
they should be tailored and tested before being rolled out. Some potential arguments 
are set out in Box 1. Governments can use the results of modelling studies to back up 
these claims and show that the carbon price will have limited (if any) negative impacts on 
the economy, as for example the Australian government has done. However, these 
messages should be thoroughly tested, as the public and key stakeholder groups will not 
necessarily respond positively to study results or expert opinion. It is also important that 
these messages are communicated in simple and clear terms, ideally by trusted 
communicators.  
 Governments should also take pains to differentiate between impacts on a given 
industry and impacts on the economy as a whole. Several sectors stand to gain from 
carbon pricing, and governments should consider engaging with those sectors early on 
and engaging them as supporters and champions of the policy. 
 Policy compromises can limit negative impacts on economic sectors. To the extent 
that key sectors are negatively impacted by a carbon price, the government can consider 
addressing these impacts while taking care not to limit the effectiveness of the carbon 
price. For example, British Columbia reduced corporate and labour taxes to compensate 
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for increased costs due to the carbon tax, while Australia adopted a range of measures to 
support EITE industries. Governments can aim to ensure that its international trading 
partners have equivalent emission reduction obligations, for instance through the Paris 
Agreement and other fora such as the G20. EU countries have collective and individual 
mitigation targets that are legally binding. 
 
Box 1: Potential arguments to address leakage and competitiveness claims 
While carbon prices can create leakage and competitiveness risks, claims made by industry 
lobbyists about the level of risk are frequently overstated. While it is important to 
acknowledge and address concerns through policy design, governments also need to have 
arguments at their disposal to address exaggerated claims. The following provides some 
examples.  
 The 185 countries that ratified the Paris Agreement are under the obligation to 
reduce their emissions in line with their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). 
In the EU, all Member States have binding mitigation targets for 2030. These 
countries have all adopted or will adopt policies to achieve these goals.  
 Carbon pricing is the most efficient instrument available for meeting emissions 
targets while growing the economy and creating jobs. They provide flexibility to 
private actors, encourage green investment and avoid the red tape that comes with 
regulations. 
8.6 Ensuring the carbon price is fair (and perceived as fair) 
 The social acceptance of the carbon price depends on its perceived fairness. 
Fairness and the avoidance of negative impacts on the population as a whole and on 
vulnerable groups in particular have come through as a key issue in the debate of most 
cases studied. In some, such as Australia and France, the perceived unfairness of carbon 
pricing has led to major opposition to the carbon price. In addition to designing the policy 
in a way that promotes fairness, governments have a range of strategies and arguments 
at their disposal to promote the carbon price as a fair policy that addresses the concerns 
of vulnerable groups. 
 Targeted and transparent use of revenues is a key tool for generating support. It is 
important to effectively communicate how the revenue from the carbon price is being used 
to bring benefits to people. In Switzerland, initial low awareness of the government’s use 
of carbon tax revenues to provide rebates to all citizens on their insurance premiums was 
addressed by sending letters explaining why they were receiving these payments. In 
France, in contrast, a lack of transparency in revenue recycling, and a simultaneous cut in 
wealth taxes and social benefits in the 2019 national budget gave rise to a sense of social 
injustice. Similarly, in Australia the government directed most of its revenue toward 
support for households, this was not successfully communicated and many people 
remained unaware of this support. 
 Some measures tend to be more visible than other measures. For example, tax 
rebates – such as those provided in Switzerland – tend to be more concrete and visible to 
individuals than general tax reductions, such as those implemented in British Columbia, or 
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those that impact them only indirectly, such as France’s tax credits aimed at boosting 
employment. There might also be a trade-off between economic efficiency (labour tax 
reductions are very efficient) and maximizing the degree to which revenue recycling is 
actively perceived and, hence, useful in promoting (and defending) the policy. 
 Governments need to be aware of timing and the role of external factors in shaping 
how the policy is perceived. It is important to note that the general economic and 
political context of a country may also outweigh any design features or positive 
communications campaigns. The timing of the policy is therefore crucial. In France for 
instance, a spike in oil prices and increases in other taxes (on tobacco, social service 
contributions in parallel to the abolishment of wealth tax) that coincided with carbon tax 
increases also increased the negative perception of the carbon tax’s impacts. 
 If the fairness narrative is used, the policy needs to consistently tackle emissions 
by industry and consumers. Placing too high a burden on consumers vis-à-vis industry 
can undermine the argument that the policy makes polluters pay. For example, in France, 
critics raised the issue that big companies are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary citizens 
due to several exemptions in place. Directing revenue toward social spending may help to 
address these concerns. 
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